Standard logic is explosive, that is, anything follows from a true contradiction. This is a semantic consequence of the fact that standard logic does not admit of true contradictions. However, if a logic admits of true contradictions and therefore does not have explosiveness as a semantic consequence, one can avoid explosiveness and have a paraconsistent logic. The question remains: Is there a true contradiction?
There is. Each person is an individual, that is, is unique, particularly in their perspective. However, the very fact that this is true for every person creates a paradox: in our uniqueness, we are all the same. This is a paradox, a contradiction, but is it true? Can two persons share a perspective? If so, then differences could only come through the constitution of the persons. Is every person internally unique? Even if two persons start out as internally exactly similar and share a perspective, is it inevitable that one of them will change, thus making them both unique?
All that aside, it remains the case that if this contradiction is true, then the justification for explosiveness fails, thus making the logic paraconsistent. This means that not anything follows from a contradiction, so some standard theorems also fail; one of those that fails is "P -> (~P -> Q)".
Wednesday, January 29, 2014
Tuesday, January 28, 2014
Meta-Ethics 2: Formulations of the Categorical Imperative
Ones intention should be to conform to the moral law, otherwise known as the categorical imperative (CI). It is the most basic principle against which all actions are judged on an ethical basis. An agent is obligated to follow the moral law, which is to say that should be rationally autonomous, which requires that it has free will; however, a person is a being which must operate under the presumption that it has free will: persons are also bound by the moral law.
The Humanity Formulation of the CI or "to treat other person as end-in-themselves, not merely as a means to your own ends" is logically equivalent to three other statements. Kant's original formulation of the CI is "Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time consistently will that it become <i>a universal law of nature for all persons</i>" is is the first; it sees persons as potential legislators of universal laws. Laws of nature must be consistent, so in order to graduate from potential legislator to actual legislator, a person must will only what is right.
The Autonomy Formulation of the CI or "the Idea of the will of every rational being as a will that legislates universal law" obligates persons to act as though they were actual legislators of universal law. It sees persons as citizens, that is, persons with the right of franchise which is the right to vote. Voting is a fundamental right of all persons, but one should only vote for what is ethically right. To do otherwise is to vote for an exception for some person, which creates a legal privilege not an ethical right.
"To act as though one were a subject in the Kingdom of Ends" is another formulation of the categorical imperative; unlike the the Autonomy Formulation, the Kingdom of Ends Formulation focuses on persons not as citizens, but as subjects in the Kingdom of Ends. It introduces a social aspect to the CI; if a legislator makes an exception for him- or herself, then it is, by definition, a legal privilege, not an ethical right. This highlights the distinction between law and ethics; neither law nor ethics logically implies the other one, but they are deontologically related: law should enforce only ethical actions.
The Humanity Formulation of the CI or "to treat other person as end-in-themselves, not merely as a means to your own ends" is logically equivalent to three other statements. Kant's original formulation of the CI is "Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time consistently will that it become <i>a universal law of nature for all persons</i>" is is the first; it sees persons as potential legislators of universal laws. Laws of nature must be consistent, so in order to graduate from potential legislator to actual legislator, a person must will only what is right.
The Autonomy Formulation of the CI or "the Idea of the will of every rational being as a will that legislates universal law" obligates persons to act as though they were actual legislators of universal law. It sees persons as citizens, that is, persons with the right of franchise which is the right to vote. Voting is a fundamental right of all persons, but one should only vote for what is ethically right. To do otherwise is to vote for an exception for some person, which creates a legal privilege not an ethical right.
"To act as though one were a subject in the Kingdom of Ends" is another formulation of the categorical imperative; unlike the the Autonomy Formulation, the Kingdom of Ends Formulation focuses on persons not as citizens, but as subjects in the Kingdom of Ends. It introduces a social aspect to the CI; if a legislator makes an exception for him- or herself, then it is, by definition, a legal privilege, not an ethical right. This highlights the distinction between law and ethics; neither law nor ethics logically implies the other one, but they are deontologically related: law should enforce only ethical actions.
Sunday, January 19, 2014
Meta-Ethics: Grounding Morality
Agency is rational autonomy, which is the control of the self by the intellect. Without agency, one is not responsible for ones actions, which means that one is not an ethical being. The fundamental duty of all ethical beings is to respect agency, not merely ones own agency (as that is merely respecting oneself), but the agency of all agents. This is what Kant called the categorical imperative, which means that unlike so-called hypothetical imperatives, it is not done for the sake of something else. That is, one ought to respect agency not because of any positive consequences it could have for oneself, but simply because it is the right thing to do. To respect somebody means to not use them as merely means to your own ends, but to treat them as ends-in-themselves; this is the ground of morality.
Wednesday, January 1, 2014
Knowledge: Internal and External
Internal knowledge is independent of any particular external experience; it uses intellectual intuition to abstract necessary relationships and patterns between possibilities. Primarily, this includes knowledge of ones own existence, but extends to all logical truths as well; the truths of the logic used in analyzing and synthesizing possibilities ought to be accepted as necessarily true, otherwise we are believing inconsistently. Knowledge of ones own existence is, as Descartes showed us, provable (at least to oneself): I think therefore I am; perhaps there are at least two levels of being, since it is also true are "I have an experience therefore I am" and "I feel therefore I am". Importantly, knowledge of ones own existence implies one has knowledge that an external world exists (although ones experiences of it might be inaccurate); that is, in order to distinguish oneself as an individual, one must draw a distinction between oneself and the external world. In other words, there is no I without a not-I.
Since external experience can be inaccurate, external knowledge must have a coherentist, fallibilistic nature; that is, what justifies a belief about an external experience is that it coheres with other external experiences with the caveat that it can be inaccurate and may be superseded by more coherent experiences that have contradictory implications. At the foundation of external knowledge lies sensuous intuition, which is our way of gathering information about the external world; sensuous intuition exists in multiple modalities: auditory, visual, tactile, olfactory, gustatory, kinesthetic, etc.. Each modality provides fallible information about the world through its medium; through apperception, we unify the various sensory modalities into an experience, upon which we base our empirical beliefs.
Since external experience can be inaccurate, external knowledge must have a coherentist, fallibilistic nature; that is, what justifies a belief about an external experience is that it coheres with other external experiences with the caveat that it can be inaccurate and may be superseded by more coherent experiences that have contradictory implications. At the foundation of external knowledge lies sensuous intuition, which is our way of gathering information about the external world; sensuous intuition exists in multiple modalities: auditory, visual, tactile, olfactory, gustatory, kinesthetic, etc.. Each modality provides fallible information about the world through its medium; through apperception, we unify the various sensory modalities into an experience, upon which we base our empirical beliefs.
Saturday, November 23, 2013
My Theodicy: Explaining the Possibility of an Omnipotent, Omniscient, Omnibenevolent Being
One of the premises of the ontological argument is that the concept of the omnipotent is logically consistent, but is the concept of the omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent also logically consistent? Or, is it impossible and we are left with only an omnipotent being? According to the Argument from Evil, it is not.
The Argument from Evil is relatively simple. To make things easier, let's just call the omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being God. If God is omnibenevolent, God would stop all evil that God is capable of stopping and knows about from happening. Since God is omniscient, God knows when something evil is going to happen and since God is omnipotent, God is capable of stopping it. So, why is there evil in the world? The atheist's response is that, at least, God doesn't exist, or, at most, the concept of the omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being is logically incoherent; that is, God is impossible. So, what's my answer?
Evil exists because, in order to create an ethically relevant world, which God is obligated to do because God is omnibenevolent, God must create a world in which free will is possible (thus allowing for intentional evils); also, the best of all possible worlds, one in which all free willed beings freely choose to do good, must be possible. In order to do this, God is obligated to make it so that causation is probablistic, that is, that, given any particular present, there is more than one possible future (in a deterministic cosmos, there is one and only one possible future given any particular present); this allows for so-called natural evils such as hurricanes, earthquakes, etc.. Furthermore, because God is omnipotent, God is obligated to not directly interfere with the world unless free will becomes impossible; this is because the active will of an omnipotent being determines one and only one possible outcome, thus negating free will.
So, in short, I'm a deist.
The Argument from Evil is relatively simple. To make things easier, let's just call the omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being God. If God is omnibenevolent, God would stop all evil that God is capable of stopping and knows about from happening. Since God is omniscient, God knows when something evil is going to happen and since God is omnipotent, God is capable of stopping it. So, why is there evil in the world? The atheist's response is that, at least, God doesn't exist, or, at most, the concept of the omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being is logically incoherent; that is, God is impossible. So, what's my answer?
Evil exists because, in order to create an ethically relevant world, which God is obligated to do because God is omnibenevolent, God must create a world in which free will is possible (thus allowing for intentional evils); also, the best of all possible worlds, one in which all free willed beings freely choose to do good, must be possible. In order to do this, God is obligated to make it so that causation is probablistic, that is, that, given any particular present, there is more than one possible future (in a deterministic cosmos, there is one and only one possible future given any particular present); this allows for so-called natural evils such as hurricanes, earthquakes, etc.. Furthermore, because God is omnipotent, God is obligated to not directly interfere with the world unless free will becomes impossible; this is because the active will of an omnipotent being determines one and only one possible outcome, thus negating free will.
So, in short, I'm a deist.
The Leap of Faith: Omniscience and Omnibenevolence
Is the omnipotent also omniscient? That is, does
omnipotence imply omniscience? An omnipotent being can do all possible
things; knowing something is a possibility, thus, an omnipotent can know
things. This means that an omnipotent being must have a mind, otherwise
it could not know anything. So, omnipotence is at least consistent with
omniscience. However, since the omnipotent has a mind, it can have desires and if it desires to know something, because it is omnipotent, it knows it ... but this presupposes specific desires above and beyond omnipotence and therefore doesn't allow the derivation of omniscience from omnipotence. What does this all mean? It means, I believe, that a leap of faith is required to get from omnipotence to omniscience.
If something is omniscient, is it omnibenevolent? If the Platonic principle of Ignorance, which states that evil is only done unintentionally (when a being acts contrary to what is good they still believe they are acting in the interest of what is at least good for themselves), is true then a being which knew all truths would necessarily only be capable of doing good.
If something is omniscient, is it omnibenevolent? If the Platonic principle of Ignorance, which states that evil is only done unintentionally (when a being acts contrary to what is good they still believe they are acting in the interest of what is at least good for themselves), is true then a being which knew all truths would necessarily only be capable of doing good.
Friday, November 15, 2013
Omnipotence
In "Anselm and Actuality", David Lewis presents an interpretation of the ontological argument. He argues that while it is a valid argument, it isn't sound; according to Lewis, one of the premises is false because the actual world is not unique. What he means by this is that all possible worlds are equally concrete, just like the world around us; that is, they are dynamic spatiotemporal expanses of energy and mass. To my mind, the actual world is unique; even if there were spatiotemporally distinct cosmoses from ours, that doesn't mean they are entire actual worlds individually. It's just that the actual world would consist of two or more spatiotemporally distinct dynamic expanses of energy and mass.
So, with that in mind, let's continue on to the argument itself. The argument consists of three premises: the Consistency Premise, the Possibility Premise, and the Actuality Premise. It's the Actuality Premise which Lewis argues is false. Some philosophers may argue that the Possibility Premise is (also) false because they think that there are metaphysical principles in addition to the minimal constraint of logical consistency; I can't think of any way of verifying supposed metaphysical principles beyond seeing if they are logically necessary or at least consistent. Also, some philosophers may argue that the Consistency Premise is false, based on "rock heavier than an omnipotent being can move" objections; my counterobjection to this is that the concept of something heavier than can be moved by an omnipotent being is inconsistent, that is, such a thing is literally impossible, which means that an omnipotent being doesn't have to be able to do it. That is, an omnipotent being only needs to be able to do all possibilities; this is so-called logical omnipotence.
1. Consistency: The concept of the omnipotent is logically consistent.
2. Possibility: Logical consistency implies metaphysical possibility.
3. Actuality: Something actual is more powerful than something merely possible.
Conclusion: The omnipotent is actual.
Another presupposition of this argument is that the concept of omnipotence is comprehensible. Perhaps omnipotence is so far beyond our finite capacities that even our best understanding of it fails woefully short of truly grasping the nature of omnipotence. I would counter that we have developed finitely long sentences which intuitively express the nature of infinity and the transfinite hierarchy. In a meta-predicate logic, there are propositions which intuitively express simple infinity, such as that of the natural numbers (0, 1, 2 ...). Beyond that, you can prove that there are infinities which are bigger than simple infinity; for instance, the real numbers (such as pi, e, etc.) are more numerous than the natural numbers. You can also prove that for each infinity, there's at least one other one which is strictly larger than it. So, the question becomes, how many possible powers are there?
A power is an ability to bring about some possible state-of-affairs. So, how many possible states-of-affairs are there? Even if the physical is all there is and is necessarily finite, there's no logical limit on how big it can be; that is, it is finite, but arbitrarily large. There may be limits on how much energy you can stuff into a particular volume of spacetime (the amount that would cause a black hole to form in that volume), but there seemingly is no logical limit on how big spacetime can itself get (the rate of cosmic expansion is accelerating currently, in fact). That means, there are at least a simple infinity of possible states-of-affairs that are consistent with the laws of nature; but there's seemingly no logical necessity to the laws of nature. Given that there can be spatiotemporally distinct regions of the actual world, there could be other universes out there that operate under different laws of nature; each set of laws would generate at least a simple infinity of possible states-of-affairs. So, the physical cannot be all there is, since it is necessarily finite, but something infinite, namely, possibility itself exists given that the physical exists (which it apparently does). So, the number of possible states-of-affairs is at least simply infinite, which means there are at least a simple infinity of powers. So, given that the omnipotent exists and has all powers, it is not a finite being; if the physical is necessarily finite, then the omnipotent is non-physical.
So, with that in mind, let's continue on to the argument itself. The argument consists of three premises: the Consistency Premise, the Possibility Premise, and the Actuality Premise. It's the Actuality Premise which Lewis argues is false. Some philosophers may argue that the Possibility Premise is (also) false because they think that there are metaphysical principles in addition to the minimal constraint of logical consistency; I can't think of any way of verifying supposed metaphysical principles beyond seeing if they are logically necessary or at least consistent. Also, some philosophers may argue that the Consistency Premise is false, based on "rock heavier than an omnipotent being can move" objections; my counterobjection to this is that the concept of something heavier than can be moved by an omnipotent being is inconsistent, that is, such a thing is literally impossible, which means that an omnipotent being doesn't have to be able to do it. That is, an omnipotent being only needs to be able to do all possibilities; this is so-called logical omnipotence.
1. Consistency: The concept of the omnipotent is logically consistent.
2. Possibility: Logical consistency implies metaphysical possibility.
3. Actuality: Something actual is more powerful than something merely possible.
Conclusion: The omnipotent is actual.
Another presupposition of this argument is that the concept of omnipotence is comprehensible. Perhaps omnipotence is so far beyond our finite capacities that even our best understanding of it fails woefully short of truly grasping the nature of omnipotence. I would counter that we have developed finitely long sentences which intuitively express the nature of infinity and the transfinite hierarchy. In a meta-predicate logic, there are propositions which intuitively express simple infinity, such as that of the natural numbers (0, 1, 2 ...). Beyond that, you can prove that there are infinities which are bigger than simple infinity; for instance, the real numbers (such as pi, e, etc.) are more numerous than the natural numbers. You can also prove that for each infinity, there's at least one other one which is strictly larger than it. So, the question becomes, how many possible powers are there?
A power is an ability to bring about some possible state-of-affairs. So, how many possible states-of-affairs are there? Even if the physical is all there is and is necessarily finite, there's no logical limit on how big it can be; that is, it is finite, but arbitrarily large. There may be limits on how much energy you can stuff into a particular volume of spacetime (the amount that would cause a black hole to form in that volume), but there seemingly is no logical limit on how big spacetime can itself get (the rate of cosmic expansion is accelerating currently, in fact). That means, there are at least a simple infinity of possible states-of-affairs that are consistent with the laws of nature; but there's seemingly no logical necessity to the laws of nature. Given that there can be spatiotemporally distinct regions of the actual world, there could be other universes out there that operate under different laws of nature; each set of laws would generate at least a simple infinity of possible states-of-affairs. So, the physical cannot be all there is, since it is necessarily finite, but something infinite, namely, possibility itself exists given that the physical exists (which it apparently does). So, the number of possible states-of-affairs is at least simply infinite, which means there are at least a simple infinity of powers. So, given that the omnipotent exists and has all powers, it is not a finite being; if the physical is necessarily finite, then the omnipotent is non-physical.
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