Sunday, January 27, 2019

General Education


Primary 4-14
Reading / Writing / Typing
Mathematics and Logic
Introductory Civics and History
Introductory Arts
First and Introductory Second Language

Secondary 21
Civics and History

Academic
Arts
Advanced First, Second and Introductory Third Language
Introductory Physical Sciences (chemistry, physics)
Introductory Biological Sciences (biology, genetics)
Introductory Earth Sciences (climatology, geology)
Introductory Trades

Trade
Second and Advanced First Language
Introductory Trades and First Trade

Undergraduate

Academic
Advanced Logic
Introductory History and Moral Philosophy
Advanced Second, Third, and Introductory Fourth Language
Physical Science (physics or chemistry)
Biological Science (biology or genetics)
Earth Science (climatology or geology)

Trade
Advanced Civics and History
Second Trade
Graduate 2 years – masters in some specific field

Academic
History and Moral Philosophy
Advanced Third, Fourth, and Introductory Fifth Language

Trade
Introductory History and Moral Philosophy
Third Trade

Post-Graduate continuing – Ph.D. In some specific field

Academic
Advanced History and Moral Philosophy
Advanced Fourth, Fifth, and Introductory Sixth Language

Trade
History and Moral Philosophy
Fourth Trade

Tuesday, May 8, 2018

On Practical Absurdity

A practical absurdity is when maximizing something undermines itself; two of the practical considerations where maximization undermines itself are those of tolerance and the free market. If people tolerate intolerance, the intolerant are empowered to destroy tolerance; similarly, if a market is completely free, that is, unregulated, then some companies will become powerful enough to be able to enforce monopolies.

What other practical paradoxes are there?

Sunday, April 3, 2016

Kant's Argument from Morality for the Existence of the God

Kant's argument from morality grounds itself in the existence of morality. Morality exists if and only if at least one person exists, a person either being an agent or a being that must behave as if it were an agent; since only an end in itself can ground morality, and all other ends are merely instrumental ends for the good of a person, personhood is the only possible ground of morality. Consequently, a person should respect other persons in the same way they respect themselves, qua personhood; this it the categorical imperative, which is the fundamental theorem of morality. Since I am a person, morality exists. Given the categorical imperative, persons should be morally perfect; if obligation implies possibility, then persons can become morally perfect. However, if, as according to Kant, it is impossible to attain perfection given a finite lifespan, persons must be immortal. This requires them to have an eternally morally perfect judge to verify their perfection; this judge must therefore also be omniscient. Consequently, this judge must be omnipotent, and therefore unique.

Saturday, March 26, 2016

The God

An anselmian argument establishes the existence of an omnipotent being. A lockean argument establishes that there can be at most one omnipotent being. A kantian argument establishes the moral perfection of the omnipotent being.

The anselmian argument restricts "greatness" to "power". This allows for the argument to be sound, not merely valid. The first premise is the consistency premise: the concept of an omnipotent being is logically consistent. The second premise is the possibility premise: if a concept is logically consistent, it refers to, at least, a possible object. The third premise is the actualization premise: an actualizing thing is necessarily more powerful than a merely possible thing. The conclusion is that an omnipotent being exists.

The lockean argument is as follows. If there exists at least two omnipotent beings, then either their wills are always in agreement or they come into conflict. If they are always in agreement, there is no meaningful sense in which they are different wills; what defines as agent, as an individual, is what it wills. If they come into conflict, then one of them loses and is therefore non-omnipotent. Therefore, there can be at most one omnipotent being. Thus, combined with the anselmian argument, there exists one and only one omnipotent being.

The kantian argument begins with the existence of at least one person; a person is a being which either is an agent or must behave as if it were. Persons are all bound by the categorical imperative, consequently, universal respect for personhood forms the ground of ethics. Cosquently, all persons should be morally perfect. Obligation implies possibility, therefore, moral perfection for persons is possible. However, it is impossible given a finite lifespan; therefore the soul is immortal. For non-eternally morally perfect persons, there must exist a judge which is distinct from itself which judges whether or not it achieves perfection. Therefore, this being must be omniscient. Since ignorance is evil, omniscience implies omnibenevolence.

Saturday, May 30, 2015

My Theodicy Continued

In order for God, the omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent creator and sustainer of the world, to create a world in which finite agency, and therefore, humanity can exist, God had to create a world in which God's consciousness could only grow so big. That is, at a certain point, God's consciousness had to fracture into multiple gods which are possibly overlapping, simply infinite parts of the originally transfinite consciousness of God. This continues until the infinite parts of God's consciousness have to fracture into infinite sets of finite parts of God's consciousness. Finite agents, finite parts of God's consciousness, are persons.

I also believe that a person can grow into a god.

Sunday, October 19, 2014

Humanity and Personhood

When does a human being begin having rights and responsibilities? That is, when does a member of the species [i]homo sapiens[/i] become a person? This is asking about the relationship between a biological concept and an ethical concept. I'll leave defining the concept of a human being to the biologists, but will explore the concept of being a person below.

First of all, by "person" I mean "a being that either is or must act if it is a moral agent". A moral agent is a being with free will. Free will is being able to influence the probabilities of events while not being under the influence of external factors; that is the negative definition. Positively, having free will is giving the moral law to oneself. Free will also means rational autonomy, which is having a will which is under the influence of only itself and its rationality. To contrast, a moral patient is a being which can suffer.

Now, basic to the original question: when does a human being become a person? I would argue that a human being becomes a person when it is capable of reflecting on its moral agency. That is, when a human realizes that it is a person is when it is a person. This requires a human to develop a level of consciousness which allows it to think its own agency; that is, when a human cannot but believe is has free will is when it qualifies as a person.

Thursday, June 19, 2014

On the Finiteness of the Physical

What is the essential difference between physical and non-physical actuality? Non-physical actuality can be infinite; physical actuality must be finite. Why must physical actuality be finite?

First of all, there are two of Zeno's Paradoxes: the Dichotomy and the Achilles, both of which are critiques of continuous motion in infinite space and time. Ultimately, this is seemingly best understood as the paradox of Zeno's Maze.

(Image from MathPages.)

If space, time, and motion (mass and energy) are all infinitely divisible then one can construct an infinite sequence of mirrors, the separation between which decreases geometrically, such that, if the first mirror is 1 unit from the second, the second is 1/2 unit from the third, the third is 1/4 unit from the fourth, etc..Therefore, after a finite amount of time, a point-particle goes a finite distance, and therefore must exit the maze; but the maze is infinite, therefore there is no last mirror, which means that it cannot exit the maze. This is a contradiction; therefore, space, time, and motion (mass and energy) must be only finitely divisible.

Next, there is Hilbert's Paradox of the Grand Hotel. If you have an infinite number of rooms in a hotel, you can always accommodate one more room of guests by moving each room to the next. Or, you can accommodate countably infinitely more guests by moving room one to room two, room two to room four, room three to room six, etc.. There more paradoxes of physical infinitude like this, all of which we owe to Hilbert.

Interestingly, there is an argument against the possibility of finitely-divisible, such that, if within each instant there is no motion, then there can be no motion regardless of how many more you add to it. In order for motion to be possible within an instant, space, time, energy, and mass must interrelate in such a way as to create motion in spacetime. That is, they must be relative to each other.

Zeno's last famous paradox considers the implications of a finite upper limit on velocity and is also ultimately an argument for the relativity of motion in spacetime. Clocks that are in motion relative to each other run slower or faster than clocks which are not in motion relative to each other. Does this require that the past, present, and future are all on the same ontological footing?

I do not believe that they are: the past is fixed, the present fixes, and the future can be fixed. That is, the future is a field of probability, possible futures with various probabilities; the present is the eternally changing Now, the flux of physical actuality (actualization); and the past is the eternally expanding sequence of events that have transpired.

Wednesday, January 29, 2014

Return to Logic: the Case for Paraconsistent Logic

Standard logic is explosive, that is, anything follows from a true contradiction. This is a semantic consequence of the fact that standard logic does not admit of true contradictions. However, if a logic admits of true contradictions and therefore does not have explosiveness as a semantic consequence, one can avoid explosiveness and have a paraconsistent logic. The question remains: Is there a true contradiction?

There is. Each person is an individual, that is, is unique, particularly in their perspective. However, the very fact that this is true for every person creates a paradox: in our uniqueness, we are all the same. This is a paradox, a contradiction, but is it true? Can two persons share a perspective? If so, then differences could only come through the constitution of the persons. Is every person internally unique? Even if two persons start out as internally exactly similar and share a perspective, is it inevitable that one of them will change, thus making them both unique?

All that aside, it remains the case that if this contradiction is true, then the justification for explosiveness fails, thus making the logic paraconsistent. This means that not anything follows from a contradiction, so some standard theorems also fail; one of those that fails is "P -> (~P -> Q)".

Tuesday, January 28, 2014

Meta-Ethics 2: Formulations of the Categorical Imperative

Ones intention should be to conform to the moral law, otherwise known as the categorical imperative (CI). It is the most basic principle against which all actions are judged on an ethical basis. An agent is obligated to follow the moral law, which is to say that should be rationally autonomous, which requires that it has free will; however, a person is a being which must operate under the presumption that it has free will: persons are also bound by the moral law.

The Humanity Formulation of the CI or "to treat other person as end-in-themselves, not merely as a means to your own ends" is logically equivalent to three other statements. Kant's original formulation of the CI is "Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time consistently will that it become <i>a universal law of nature for all persons</i>" is is the first; it sees persons as potential legislators of universal laws. Laws of nature must be consistent, so in order to graduate from potential legislator to actual legislator, a person must will only what is right.

The Autonomy Formulation of the CI or "the Idea of the will of every rational being as a will that legislates universal law" obligates persons to act as though they were actual legislators of universal law. It sees persons as citizens, that is, persons with the right of franchise which is the right to vote. Voting is a fundamental right of all persons, but one should only vote for what is ethically right. To do otherwise is to vote for an exception for some person, which creates a legal privilege not an ethical right.

"To act as though one were a subject in the Kingdom of Ends" is another formulation of the categorical imperative; unlike the the Autonomy Formulation, the Kingdom of Ends Formulation focuses on persons not as citizens, but as subjects in the Kingdom of Ends. It introduces a social aspect to the CI; if a legislator makes an exception for him- or herself, then it is, by definition, a legal privilege, not an ethical right. This highlights the distinction between law and ethics; neither law nor ethics logically implies the other one, but they are deontologically related: law should enforce only ethical actions.

Sunday, January 19, 2014

Meta-Ethics: Grounding Morality

Agency is rational autonomy, which is the control of the self by the intellect. Without agency, one is not responsible for ones actions, which means that one is not an ethical being. The fundamental duty of all ethical beings is to respect agency, not merely ones own agency (as that is merely respecting oneself), but the agency of all agents. This is what Kant called the categorical imperative, which means that unlike so-called hypothetical imperatives, it is not done for the sake of something else. That is, one ought to respect agency not because of any positive consequences it could have for oneself, but simply because it is the right thing to do. To respect somebody means to not use them as merely means to your own ends, but to treat them as ends-in-themselves; this is the ground of morality.

Wednesday, January 1, 2014

Knowledge: Internal and External

Internal knowledge is independent of any particular external experience; it uses intellectual intuition to abstract necessary relationships and patterns between possibilities. Primarily, this includes knowledge of ones own existence, but extends to all logical truths as well; the truths of the logic used in analyzing and synthesizing possibilities ought to be accepted as necessarily true, otherwise we are believing inconsistently. Knowledge of ones own existence is, as Descartes showed us, provable (at least to oneself): I think therefore I am; perhaps there are at least two levels of being, since it is also true are "I have an experience therefore I am" and "I feel therefore I am". Importantly, knowledge of ones own existence implies one has knowledge that an external world exists (although ones experiences of it might be inaccurate); that is, in order to distinguish oneself as an individual, one must draw a distinction between oneself and the external world. In other words, there is no I without a not-I.

Since external experience can be inaccurate, external knowledge must have a coherentist, fallibilistic nature; that is, what justifies a belief about an external experience is that it coheres with other external experiences with the caveat that it can be inaccurate and may be superseded by more coherent experiences that have contradictory implications. At the foundation of external knowledge lies sensuous intuition, which is our way of gathering information about the external world; sensuous intuition exists in multiple modalities: auditory, visual, tactile, olfactory, gustatory, kinesthetic, etc.. Each modality provides fallible information about the world through its medium; through apperception, we unify the various sensory modalities into an experience, upon which we base our empirical beliefs.

Saturday, November 23, 2013

My Theodicy: Explaining the Possibility of an Omnipotent, Omniscient, Omnibenevolent Being

One of the premises of the ontological argument is that the concept of the omnipotent is logically consistent, but is the concept of the omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent also logically consistent? Or, is it impossible and we are left with only an omnipotent being? According to the Argument from Evil, it is not.

The Argument from Evil is relatively simple. To make things easier, let's just call the omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being God. If God is omnibenevolent, God would stop all evil that God is capable of stopping and knows about from happening. Since God is omniscient, God knows when something evil is going to happen and since God is omnipotent, God is capable of stopping it. So, why is there evil in the world? The atheist's response is that, at least, God doesn't exist, or, at most, the concept of the omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being is logically incoherent; that is, God is impossible. So, what's my answer?

Evil exists because, in order to create an ethically relevant world, which God is obligated to do because God is omnibenevolent, God must create a world in which free will is possible (thus allowing for intentional evils); also, the best of all possible worlds, one in which all free willed beings freely choose to do good, must be possible. In order to do this, God is obligated to make it so that causation is probablistic, that is, that, given any particular present, there is more than one possible future (in a deterministic cosmos, there is one and only one possible future given any particular present); this allows for so-called natural evils such as hurricanes, earthquakes, etc.. Furthermore, because God is omnipotent, God is obligated to not directly interfere with the world unless free will becomes impossible; this is because the active will of an omnipotent being determines one and only one possible outcome, thus negating free will.

So, in short, I'm a deist.

The Leap of Faith: Omniscience and Omnibenevolence

Is the omnipotent also omniscient? That is, does omnipotence imply omniscience? An omnipotent being can do all possible things; knowing something is a possibility, thus, an omnipotent can know things. This means that an omnipotent being must have a mind, otherwise it could not know anything. So, omnipotence is at least consistent with omniscience. However, since the omnipotent has a mind, it can have desires and if it desires to know something, because it is omnipotent, it knows it ... but this presupposes specific desires above and beyond omnipotence and therefore doesn't allow the derivation of omniscience from omnipotence. What does this all mean? It means, I believe, that a leap of faith is required to get from omnipotence to omniscience.

If something is omniscient, is it omnibenevolent? If the Platonic principle of Ignorance, which states that evil is only done unintentionally (when a being acts contrary to what is good they still believe they are acting in the interest of what is at least good for themselves), is true then a being which knew all truths would necessarily only be capable of doing good.

Friday, November 15, 2013

Omnipotence

In "Anselm and Actuality", David Lewis presents an interpretation of the ontological argument. He argues that while it is a valid argument, it isn't sound; according to Lewis, one of the premises is false because the actual world is not unique. What he means by this is that all possible worlds are equally concrete, just like the world around us; that is, they are dynamic spatiotemporal expanses of energy and mass. To my mind, the actual world is unique; even if there were spatiotemporally distinct cosmoses from ours, that doesn't mean they are entire actual worlds individually. It's just that the actual world would consist of two or more spatiotemporally distinct dynamic expanses of energy and mass.

So, with that in mind, let's continue on to the argument itself. The argument consists of three premises: the Consistency Premise, the Possibility Premise, and the Actuality Premise. It's the Actuality Premise which Lewis argues is false. Some philosophers may argue that the Possibility Premise is (also) false because they think that there are metaphysical principles in addition to the minimal constraint of logical consistency; I can't think of any way of verifying supposed metaphysical principles beyond seeing if they are logically necessary or at least consistent. Also, some philosophers may argue that the Consistency Premise is false, based on "rock heavier than an omnipotent being can move" objections; my counterobjection to this is that the concept of something heavier than can be moved by an omnipotent being is inconsistent, that is, such a thing is literally impossible, which means that an omnipotent being doesn't have to be able to do it. That is, an omnipotent being only needs to be able to do all possibilities; this is so-called logical omnipotence.

1. Consistency: The concept of the omnipotent is logically consistent.
2. Possibility: Logical consistency implies metaphysical possibility.
3. Actuality: Something actual is more powerful than something merely possible.
Conclusion: The omnipotent is actual.

Another presupposition of this argument is that the concept of omnipotence is comprehensible. Perhaps omnipotence is so far beyond our finite capacities that even our best understanding of it fails woefully short of truly grasping the nature of omnipotence. I would counter that we have developed finitely long sentences which intuitively express the nature of infinity and the transfinite hierarchy. In a meta-predicate logic, there are propositions which intuitively express simple infinity, such as that of the natural numbers (0, 1, 2 ...). Beyond that, you can prove that there are infinities which are bigger than simple infinity; for instance, the real numbers (such as pi, e, etc.) are more numerous than the natural numbers. You can also prove that for each infinity, there's at least one other one which is strictly larger than it. So, the question becomes, how many possible powers are there?

A power is an ability to bring about some possible state-of-affairs. So, how many possible states-of-affairs are there? Even if the physical is all there is and is necessarily finite, there's no logical limit on how big it can be; that is, it is finite, but arbitrarily large. There may be limits on how much energy you can stuff into a particular volume of spacetime (the amount that would cause a black hole to form in that volume), but there seemingly is no logical limit on how big spacetime can itself get (the rate of cosmic expansion is accelerating currently, in fact). That means, there are at least a simple infinity of possible states-of-affairs that are consistent with the laws of nature; but there's seemingly no logical necessity to the laws of nature. Given that there can be spatiotemporally distinct regions of the actual world, there could be other universes out there that operate under different laws of nature; each set of laws would generate at least a simple infinity of possible states-of-affairs. So, the physical cannot be all there is, since it is necessarily finite, but something infinite, namely, possibility itself exists given that the physical exists (which it apparently does). So, the number of possible states-of-affairs is at least simply infinite, which means there are at least a simple infinity of powers. So, given that the omnipotent exists and has all powers, it is not a finite being; if the physical is necessarily finite, then the omnipotent is non-physical.

Beyond Meta-Predicate Logic: Set Theory

Set theory is a powerful tool in the logic of mathematics and other abstract areas of philosophical study. In set theory, there are two types of entities: elements and sets. In pure set theory, there are only sets; this is possible because sets can be elements of other sets and there is a such thing as the empty set. We will discuss pure set theory first. There is one relation in set theory or set theoretic operator which is that of membership. You can construct another set theoretic operator which expresses the concept of subsethood. A set, S, is a subset of another set, T, if and only if every member of S is a member of T (this also means that the empty set is a subset of every set). Two sets are identical just in case each is a subset of the other. Another set theoretic operator you can construct is called the powerset relation. A set, S, is the powerset of another set, T, if and only if S is the set of all subsets of T. Interestingly, the powerset of a set is always strictly larger than the set itself. For instance, the powerset of the empty set, {}, is the set which contains only the empty set {{}}; the powerset of the set which contains only the empty set is the set which contains only the empty set and the set which contains only the empty set {{},{{}}}. Etc. You can continue the powerset relation ad infinitum, constructing (or discovering) an infinite hierarchy of infinities.

Saturday, November 9, 2013

Another Paradox of Standard Logic

Prelinearity isn't the only counterintuitive consequence of propositional logic. Another is called explosiveness or ex falso quodlibet, which is Latin for "from the false, anything follows". That is, from a contradiction, you can deduce any proposition; (P & ~P) implies Q or, in another form, (P implies (~P implies Q)). These statements are logically true because of the principle of non-contradiction (which states that there are no true contradictions) combined with the formal semantics of implication; the formal semantics of implication guarantees that if the antecedent of an implication is false, the implication is true. (The antecedent of an implication is the proposition that comes before "implies"; the proposition after "implies" is called the consequent.) My intuitions regarding this are that, if you presuppose a true contradiction (in order to exploit explosiveness), then you are undermining the very principle which licenses concluding anything from a contradiction; consequently, when confronted with a contradiction, one ought not to conclude anything they like, but instead consider that at least one of their premises must be false.

Thursday, November 7, 2013

A Consequence of Classical Negation

In standard propositional logic, there is a theorem which follows from no premises that can cause some controversy. So-called prelinearity states that, given any three arbitrary propositions, either the first implies the second or the second implies the third, i.e., (P implies Q) or (Q implies R). For example, either "I'm sitting at my computer" implies "the Moon is made of green cheese" or "the Moon is made of green cheese" implies "the Sun rises in the west". I'm sure you, the reader, can come up with many other absurd examples of prelinearity. However, the absurdity of it follows from a seemingly innocuous principle of standard propositional logic: classical negation.

There are four different forms that classical rules of negation take: the excluded middle, double negation elimination, dilemma, and classical reductio. The excluded middle states that there are only two truth-values for any proposition, true or false; that is, (P or ~P). Double negation elimination states that if it is false that some propositions is false then that proposition is true; that is, (~~P implies P). Dilemma states that if a proposition follows from both some other proposition and the second proposition's negation, the original proposition in question is true; that is, (((P implies Q) and (~P implies Q)) implies Q). Classical reductio states that if you can prove a contradiction from the negation of a proposition, that proposition is true; that is, (~P implies an absurdity) implies P. These rules of classical negation follow from the truth-table conception of the meanings of logical operators. An alternative approach, introduction-rule semantics (where the meanings of logical operators are determined by their associated introduction-rule), does not license the classical rules of negation.

Tuesday, November 5, 2013

Metaphilosophy 2: A Brief Introduction to Logic

Logic is the fundamental tool of philosophy. While philosophers puzzle over inductive logic, deductive arguments form the vast bulk of philosophical argumentation. Consequently, I will be discussing deduction at this point in time.

There are three broad types of basic logic: propositional, predicate, and meta-predicate. Propositional logic deals with what are expressed by whole sentences, namely, propositions. It studies the effects of the operations of the so-called logical operators on the truth-values of various propositions. The logical operators are: "... and ...", "... or ...", "if ... then ...", and "not ...". Each operator has an introduction and elimination rule associated with it that is designed to capture the standard English meaning of the operator; also, a good number of philosophers associate each operator with a truth-table, which governs how it affects truth-values in complex propositions.

An important type of logical argument in philosophy is called reductio ad absurdum or reductio for short. The name is Latin for "reduction to absurdity" and signifies a general type of argument where you suppose some proposition, prove a contradiction (an absurdity) from it, and subsequently conclude that the proposition is false. Because of the nature of truth-tables, if you suppose for reductio some proposition that begins "not ...", you end up concluding "not not ..." and can conclude "..." from there. That is, if you suppose not-P, you may be able to prove, via reductio, P.

Predicate logic breaks propositions down into a predicate-subject format; usually, this is signified by something of the form "Ps" (read "s is P"). Predicate logic allows generalization over subjects, but not predicates, by introducing two new logical operators "for all ..." and "there exists ..." (a subject goes in the "..."); these operators are called the universal and existential respectively. Introduction and elimination rules exist for these operators as well; truth-table advocates utilize so-called truth-trees to establish the effects of these new operators on the truth-values of propositions.

Finally, meta-predicate logic doesn't introduce any new operators, but allows the universal and existential operators to generalize over predicates as well as subjects. Meta-predicate logic is important because certain important things, like "finite, but arbitrarily large", cannot be expressed in any merely predicate logic.

Monday, November 4, 2013

Metaphilosophy

+Traci Auerbach talked me into starting this. So, what's this blog going to be about? Philosophy in general, by which I mean, my continuing ratiocination about what I believe to be various fundamental, necessary features of reality. Where to begin?

I'll begin with the question, "What is philosophy?" In a nutshell, philosophy is the use of intellectual intuition to discover necessary truths about reality. Let's break that sentence down: reality is all of existence; a truth is a proposition which accurately encodes information about reality; necessity means that something cannot be other than it is; discovery is the process of exploring different aspects of a thing in search of truths about it; intellectual intuition is the ability of sapient beings to analyze experience and synthesize coherent worldviews.

The next question is, "What is the method of philosophy?" The primary method of philosophy is logical analysis. Logic is the art and science of argumentation; there are two broad types of logic: deductive and inductive. A deductive argument is valid if and only if, if all of its premises are true then its conclusion must be true; it is sound if and only if it is valid and all of its premises are true. An inductive argument is cogent if and only if the conclusion is more likely to be true if its premises are true. While doing philosophy, one attempts to construct valid and cogent arguments in order to uncover truths about reality.

Next, "To what purpose does one do philosophy?" My purpose is to discover what my intuitive worldview is, analyze it for hidden contradictions, and synthesize a more accurate and coherent worldview. Why is this good? In my opinion, if ones worldview is incoherent, then one will find themselves in situations where they cannot, in principle, know what to do; also, the more accurate ones worldview is, the better one is able to navigate reality.