When does a human being begin having rights and responsibilities? That is, when does a member of the species [i]homo sapiens[/i] become a person? This is asking about the relationship between a biological concept and an ethical concept. I'll leave defining the concept of a human being to the biologists, but will explore the concept of being a person below.
First of all, by "person" I mean "a being that either is or must act if it is a moral agent". A moral agent is a being with free will. Free will is being able to influence the probabilities of events while not being under the influence of external factors; that is the negative definition. Positively, having free will is giving the moral law to oneself. Free will also means rational autonomy, which is having a will which is under the influence of only itself and its rationality. To contrast, a moral patient is a being which can suffer.
Now, basic to the original question: when does a human being become a person? I would argue that a human being becomes a person when it is capable of reflecting on its moral agency. That is, when a human realizes that it is a person is when it is a person. This requires a human to develop a level of consciousness which allows it to think its own agency; that is, when a human cannot but believe is has free will is when it qualifies as a person.
Sunday, October 19, 2014
Thursday, June 19, 2014
On the Finiteness of the Physical
What is the essential difference between physical and non-physical actuality? Non-physical actuality can be infinite; physical actuality must be finite. Why must physical actuality be finite?
First of all, there are two of Zeno's Paradoxes: the Dichotomy and the Achilles, both of which are critiques of continuous motion in infinite space and time. Ultimately, this is seemingly best understood as the paradox of Zeno's Maze.
(Image from MathPages.)
If space, time, and motion (mass and energy) are all infinitely divisible then one can construct an infinite sequence of mirrors, the separation between which decreases geometrically, such that, if the first mirror is 1 unit from the second, the second is 1/2 unit from the third, the third is 1/4 unit from the fourth, etc..Therefore, after a finite amount of time, a point-particle goes a finite distance, and therefore must exit the maze; but the maze is infinite, therefore there is no last mirror, which means that it cannot exit the maze. This is a contradiction; therefore, space, time, and motion (mass and energy) must be only finitely divisible.
Next, there is Hilbert's Paradox of the Grand Hotel. If you have an infinite number of rooms in a hotel, you can always accommodate one more room of guests by moving each room to the next. Or, you can accommodate countably infinitely more guests by moving room one to room two, room two to room four, room three to room six, etc.. There more paradoxes of physical infinitude like this, all of which we owe to Hilbert.
Interestingly, there is an argument against the possibility of finitely-divisible, such that, if within each instant there is no motion, then there can be no motion regardless of how many more you add to it. In order for motion to be possible within an instant, space, time, energy, and mass must interrelate in such a way as to create motion in spacetime. That is, they must be relative to each other.
Zeno's last famous paradox considers the implications of a finite upper limit on velocity and is also ultimately an argument for the relativity of motion in spacetime. Clocks that are in motion relative to each other run slower or faster than clocks which are not in motion relative to each other. Does this require that the past, present, and future are all on the same ontological footing?
I do not believe that they are: the past is fixed, the present fixes, and the future can be fixed. That is, the future is a field of probability, possible futures with various probabilities; the present is the eternally changing Now, the flux of physical actuality (actualization); and the past is the eternally expanding sequence of events that have transpired.
First of all, there are two of Zeno's Paradoxes: the Dichotomy and the Achilles, both of which are critiques of continuous motion in infinite space and time. Ultimately, this is seemingly best understood as the paradox of Zeno's Maze.
(Image from MathPages.)
If space, time, and motion (mass and energy) are all infinitely divisible then one can construct an infinite sequence of mirrors, the separation between which decreases geometrically, such that, if the first mirror is 1 unit from the second, the second is 1/2 unit from the third, the third is 1/4 unit from the fourth, etc..Therefore, after a finite amount of time, a point-particle goes a finite distance, and therefore must exit the maze; but the maze is infinite, therefore there is no last mirror, which means that it cannot exit the maze. This is a contradiction; therefore, space, time, and motion (mass and energy) must be only finitely divisible.
Next, there is Hilbert's Paradox of the Grand Hotel. If you have an infinite number of rooms in a hotel, you can always accommodate one more room of guests by moving each room to the next. Or, you can accommodate countably infinitely more guests by moving room one to room two, room two to room four, room three to room six, etc.. There more paradoxes of physical infinitude like this, all of which we owe to Hilbert.
Interestingly, there is an argument against the possibility of finitely-divisible, such that, if within each instant there is no motion, then there can be no motion regardless of how many more you add to it. In order for motion to be possible within an instant, space, time, energy, and mass must interrelate in such a way as to create motion in spacetime. That is, they must be relative to each other.
Zeno's last famous paradox considers the implications of a finite upper limit on velocity and is also ultimately an argument for the relativity of motion in spacetime. Clocks that are in motion relative to each other run slower or faster than clocks which are not in motion relative to each other. Does this require that the past, present, and future are all on the same ontological footing?
I do not believe that they are: the past is fixed, the present fixes, and the future can be fixed. That is, the future is a field of probability, possible futures with various probabilities; the present is the eternally changing Now, the flux of physical actuality (actualization); and the past is the eternally expanding sequence of events that have transpired.
Wednesday, January 29, 2014
Return to Logic: the Case for Paraconsistent Logic
Standard logic is explosive, that is, anything follows from a true contradiction. This is a semantic consequence of the fact that standard logic does not admit of true contradictions. However, if a logic admits of true contradictions and therefore does not have explosiveness as a semantic consequence, one can avoid explosiveness and have a paraconsistent logic. The question remains: Is there a true contradiction?
There is. Each person is an individual, that is, is unique, particularly in their perspective. However, the very fact that this is true for every person creates a paradox: in our uniqueness, we are all the same. This is a paradox, a contradiction, but is it true? Can two persons share a perspective? If so, then differences could only come through the constitution of the persons. Is every person internally unique? Even if two persons start out as internally exactly similar and share a perspective, is it inevitable that one of them will change, thus making them both unique?
All that aside, it remains the case that if this contradiction is true, then the justification for explosiveness fails, thus making the logic paraconsistent. This means that not anything follows from a contradiction, so some standard theorems also fail; one of those that fails is "P -> (~P -> Q)".
There is. Each person is an individual, that is, is unique, particularly in their perspective. However, the very fact that this is true for every person creates a paradox: in our uniqueness, we are all the same. This is a paradox, a contradiction, but is it true? Can two persons share a perspective? If so, then differences could only come through the constitution of the persons. Is every person internally unique? Even if two persons start out as internally exactly similar and share a perspective, is it inevitable that one of them will change, thus making them both unique?
All that aside, it remains the case that if this contradiction is true, then the justification for explosiveness fails, thus making the logic paraconsistent. This means that not anything follows from a contradiction, so some standard theorems also fail; one of those that fails is "P -> (~P -> Q)".
Tuesday, January 28, 2014
Meta-Ethics 2: Formulations of the Categorical Imperative
Ones intention should be to conform to the moral law, otherwise known as the categorical imperative (CI). It is the most basic principle against which all actions are judged on an ethical basis. An agent is obligated to follow the moral law, which is to say that should be rationally autonomous, which requires that it has free will; however, a person is a being which must operate under the presumption that it has free will: persons are also bound by the moral law.
The Humanity Formulation of the CI or "to treat other person as end-in-themselves, not merely as a means to your own ends" is logically equivalent to three other statements. Kant's original formulation of the CI is "Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time consistently will that it become <i>a universal law of nature for all persons</i>" is is the first; it sees persons as potential legislators of universal laws. Laws of nature must be consistent, so in order to graduate from potential legislator to actual legislator, a person must will only what is right.
The Autonomy Formulation of the CI or "the Idea of the will of every rational being as a will that legislates universal law" obligates persons to act as though they were actual legislators of universal law. It sees persons as citizens, that is, persons with the right of franchise which is the right to vote. Voting is a fundamental right of all persons, but one should only vote for what is ethically right. To do otherwise is to vote for an exception for some person, which creates a legal privilege not an ethical right.
"To act as though one were a subject in the Kingdom of Ends" is another formulation of the categorical imperative; unlike the the Autonomy Formulation, the Kingdom of Ends Formulation focuses on persons not as citizens, but as subjects in the Kingdom of Ends. It introduces a social aspect to the CI; if a legislator makes an exception for him- or herself, then it is, by definition, a legal privilege, not an ethical right. This highlights the distinction between law and ethics; neither law nor ethics logically implies the other one, but they are deontologically related: law should enforce only ethical actions.
The Humanity Formulation of the CI or "to treat other person as end-in-themselves, not merely as a means to your own ends" is logically equivalent to three other statements. Kant's original formulation of the CI is "Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time consistently will that it become <i>a universal law of nature for all persons</i>" is is the first; it sees persons as potential legislators of universal laws. Laws of nature must be consistent, so in order to graduate from potential legislator to actual legislator, a person must will only what is right.
The Autonomy Formulation of the CI or "the Idea of the will of every rational being as a will that legislates universal law" obligates persons to act as though they were actual legislators of universal law. It sees persons as citizens, that is, persons with the right of franchise which is the right to vote. Voting is a fundamental right of all persons, but one should only vote for what is ethically right. To do otherwise is to vote for an exception for some person, which creates a legal privilege not an ethical right.
"To act as though one were a subject in the Kingdom of Ends" is another formulation of the categorical imperative; unlike the the Autonomy Formulation, the Kingdom of Ends Formulation focuses on persons not as citizens, but as subjects in the Kingdom of Ends. It introduces a social aspect to the CI; if a legislator makes an exception for him- or herself, then it is, by definition, a legal privilege, not an ethical right. This highlights the distinction between law and ethics; neither law nor ethics logically implies the other one, but they are deontologically related: law should enforce only ethical actions.
Sunday, January 19, 2014
Meta-Ethics: Grounding Morality
Agency is rational autonomy, which is the control of the self by the intellect. Without agency, one is not responsible for ones actions, which means that one is not an ethical being. The fundamental duty of all ethical beings is to respect agency, not merely ones own agency (as that is merely respecting oneself), but the agency of all agents. This is what Kant called the categorical imperative, which means that unlike so-called hypothetical imperatives, it is not done for the sake of something else. That is, one ought to respect agency not because of any positive consequences it could have for oneself, but simply because it is the right thing to do. To respect somebody means to not use them as merely means to your own ends, but to treat them as ends-in-themselves; this is the ground of morality.
Wednesday, January 1, 2014
Knowledge: Internal and External
Internal knowledge is independent of any particular external experience; it uses intellectual intuition to abstract necessary relationships and patterns between possibilities. Primarily, this includes knowledge of ones own existence, but extends to all logical truths as well; the truths of the logic used in analyzing and synthesizing possibilities ought to be accepted as necessarily true, otherwise we are believing inconsistently. Knowledge of ones own existence is, as Descartes showed us, provable (at least to oneself): I think therefore I am; perhaps there are at least two levels of being, since it is also true are "I have an experience therefore I am" and "I feel therefore I am". Importantly, knowledge of ones own existence implies one has knowledge that an external world exists (although ones experiences of it might be inaccurate); that is, in order to distinguish oneself as an individual, one must draw a distinction between oneself and the external world. In other words, there is no I without a not-I.
Since external experience can be inaccurate, external knowledge must have a coherentist, fallibilistic nature; that is, what justifies a belief about an external experience is that it coheres with other external experiences with the caveat that it can be inaccurate and may be superseded by more coherent experiences that have contradictory implications. At the foundation of external knowledge lies sensuous intuition, which is our way of gathering information about the external world; sensuous intuition exists in multiple modalities: auditory, visual, tactile, olfactory, gustatory, kinesthetic, etc.. Each modality provides fallible information about the world through its medium; through apperception, we unify the various sensory modalities into an experience, upon which we base our empirical beliefs.
Since external experience can be inaccurate, external knowledge must have a coherentist, fallibilistic nature; that is, what justifies a belief about an external experience is that it coheres with other external experiences with the caveat that it can be inaccurate and may be superseded by more coherent experiences that have contradictory implications. At the foundation of external knowledge lies sensuous intuition, which is our way of gathering information about the external world; sensuous intuition exists in multiple modalities: auditory, visual, tactile, olfactory, gustatory, kinesthetic, etc.. Each modality provides fallible information about the world through its medium; through apperception, we unify the various sensory modalities into an experience, upon which we base our empirical beliefs.
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